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JAMES Q. WHITMAN
Petrarch detested lawyers. The story of his experience of law is familiar.
In 1316 Petrarch, then twelve years old, was sent by his father to study
law, first in Montpellier, then in Bologna, the oldest center of Roman
law studies in Europe. Bologna entranced him in some ways: there
were great law teachers there, he later wrote, who were like the ancients
themselves returned to life. I Nevertheless, if he looked up to some of
his teachers, his studies in Bologna taught Petrarch to despise the
general soullessness and avarice of fourteenth-century lawyers. Lawyers,
he later wrote, cared nothing for antiquity and everything for money:
to them "everything is for sale:'2 It was not, he assured readers of his
Epistle to Posterity, that he found the subject too difficult. On the
contrary, "many asserted that I would have done very well if I had
persisted in my course. Nevertheless I dropped that study entirely as
soon as my parents' supervision was removed. Not because I disliked
the power and authority of Roman law, which are undoubtedly very
great, or its saturation with Roman antiquity, which I love; but because
men, in their wickedness, pervert Roman law when they employ it."3
Appalled by what he had seen, he gave up law for more honorable
pursuits.
In subsequent centuries, it became a fundamental tenet of the
humanist tradition that the mature work of Petrarch represented a
historic break with the crass mentality of medieval lawyers. Once
Petrarch had escaped from his ignorant and inflexible teachers, later
humanists believed, he was able to see what they had not been able to
see: that Italy had fallen into a state of desperate barbarism. He
recognized the bad Latin of his teachers for what it was. And he
recognized the political situation of Italy for what it was, awakening
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to a terrible truth that no one else had yet grasped: that the Roman
Empire had fallen, destroyed centuries earlier by a barbarian onslaught.
Much of this grand humanist legend has suffered in recent decades.
In particular, historians have discovered that classicallatinity was quite
widespread among lawyers well before Petrarch was born.4 But if
Petrarch has lost his place of honor as the first classicizing-latinist, he
has largely retained his reputation as an unprecedented knower of
historical reality. The old humanist claim that Petrarch was the first to
comprehend that terrible truth-that the Roman Empire hadJallen-
still survives, even among scholars who insist vigorously on the existence
ofa pre-Petrarchan classicallatinity.5 Notwithstanding some very learned
recent studies,6 the idea persists that Petrarch was the first to know
history as we know it. "Despite the difference in religion, until Petrarch
medieval men failed to notice a fracture between the classical age and
their own times."7 It was only Petarch who, "in contradiction to the
political theorists and historians of the Middle Ages" saw the Roman
Empire as having been " 'impaired, debilitated, and almost consumed
at the hands of the barbarians;"8 Living in an Italy that had been
repeatedly overrun during the last centuries of the Roman Empire, an
Italy dotted with ruins and populated by trousered descendants of
Germanic tribesmen, pre-Petrarchan Italians remained incapable of
understanding that a great caesura separated them from the ancients.
They thought they were still living in ancient Rome.
I will try to show, despite the tenacity of this humanist legend, that
thirteenth-century Bolognese lawyers had already come to the typically
Petrarchan conclusion that the Roman Empire had fallen. I will argue
that these thirteenth-century lawyers arrived at this proto-Petrarchan
conclusion as a result of their hatred of Lombard law, a rival legal
tradition that dated back to the Lombard invasions of Italy centuries
earlier. Their hatred of Lombard law reached a critical pitch, I will
argue, under the pressure of an identifiable event in the political history
of Bologna: an urban revolution of the years 1128-33, which recast
the statute book of Bologna in partly Lombard form. At the close of
the article, finally, I will propose a partial explanation for the odd
divergence between Petrarch's probable debt t6 this tradition among
thirteenth-century Bolognese lawyers and his hostility to the "wicked"
Roman lawyers of his age.
In making this argument, I have a number of goals. First of all, I
wish to show some of the neglected virtues of linking legal history with
political and social history.9 Thus I will place Bolognese law in the
context of Bolognese city politics and try to show that details of marital
property law that have hitherto interested only social historians are of
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great importance for understanding intellectual developments among
learned lawyers. I also wish to add evidence for a proposition I have
argued at length elsewhere: that the study ofRoman law in the centuries
after the recovery of the Digest was deeply bound up with the image
ofRome itself. 10 Roman lawyers, I want to demonstrate, had a powerful
(if often dormant) tendency to think of themselves as the guardians of
Roman tradition-as representatives of a social and moral order
different from, and superior to, the order of their own times. As a
result, they should be· seen, in many periods, less as eager servants of
the existing power structure, than as aloof moralizers and visionary
revivalists. II In all this, I hope to strike a blow for the general proposition
that legal history can never be understood without a vivid understanding
of the social and cultural details of the lives lawyers have led; and for
the proposition that there are deep connections between social and
intellectual history that clearly reveal themselves only in law.
II
At the outset, it is important to say a careful word about the
Petrarchan historical sensibility. What was noteworthy about Petrach's
outlook was not the conviction that Rome had sunk into decline. The
sense of decline is common enough in all periods. Moreover, the sense
that Rome in particular had suffered a decline could already be found
very early in the twelfth century, and it was already expressed in a
classicizing couplet when Hildebert described the ruins of the city of
Rome:
urbs cecidit, de qua si quicquam dicere dignum
moliar, hoc potero dicere "Roma fuit:'
(The city now is fallen; I can find
No worthier epitaph than: "This was Rome.")12
It was not Hildebert's sense of decline, but a sense of historical rupture
that marked the Petrarchan attitude. What set the Petrarchan attitude
apart was the belief that some particular, identifiable, historical disaster
had barbarized Italy; that Rome had, not decayed over a period of
time, but been defeated at some moment. What marked the Petrarchan
attitude was, not a sense of decline, but a sense of calamity. 13
That sense of calamity had already begun to appear in the thirteenth
century, in attacks, mounted by Roman lawyers of Bologna, on a
leading rival legal tradition of the day: Lombard law. Lombard law
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dominated in much of Italian legal practice of the thirteenth century;
in particular, numerous Lombard practices were codified, over the
course ofthe century, in the statutes ofthe northern city-states. Medieval
Roman lawyers were accordingly conscious of the presence, on the
legal landscape, of a distinctly un-Roman body oflaw, with a distinctly
barbarian history.
Lombard law was the legacy of one of the most destructive of the
barbarian invasions of the last decades of the Roman Empire. More
than any other barbarian people during the harrowing centuries at the
end of the Roman Empire, it had been the Lombards who destroyed
Roman society in Italy. The Ostrogoths, the first Germanic people to
take control of the governmental institutions of Italy, had lived in
comparative peace with Roman society.14 Their Gothic Kingdom was,
however, destroyed by the Byzantines in the mid-sixth century. IS The
Byzantines themselves quickly gave way to the Lombards, a Germanic
people with an old reputation for unique ferocity,16 who descended into
Italy late in the sixth century, erecting a kingdom in the north and
duchies in the south. The Lombard kingdom was, in its turn, destroyed
by the Franks in the eighth century. But the Lombards left a vigorous
legal tradition that coexisted with Roman law, canon law, and a number
of other traditions well into the high Middle Ages in northern Italy.17
In the thirteenth century, the details of the history of the Lombard
conquests in Italy were, to be sure, not well know. Nevertheless, its
general outlines were known, particularly in the laudatory History of
the Lombards of Paul the Deacon, composed in the eighth century
and highly popular throughout the Middle Ages. 18 Moreover, the
presence of Lombard law, still widely applied, kept the memory of the
Lombards fresh. Indeed, the presence of Lombard law stimulated
generations of denunciations by learned Roman lawyers-denuncia-
tions that, in the thirteenth century, took the form of what are, to us,
recognizable accounts of the barbarian invasions. It is these accounts-
in particular Boncompagno da Signa's Rhetorica Novissima of 1235
and various commentaries on the Corpus [uris by Odofredus-that I
wish to place in the larger context of social and legal history.
Let me begin with the Rhetorica Novissima, a long, florid lecture
read to a Bolognese audience in 1235. In this work we find, a century
before Petrarch's time, a Bolognese lawyer identifying the sixth-century
Lombard descent into the Italian peninsula as the barbarizer of Italy.
From the early twelfth century onward, Bologna was the home of a
great medieval revival ofthe learned study ofRoman law.19 Throughout
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the learned lawyers of Bologna
(generally known as "glossators") worked to explicate the legal books
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produced by the Byzantine emperor Justinian in the second quarter of
the sixth century: the Institutes (a preliminary textbook), the Digest (a
compilation of texts from the classical Roman jurists), the Code (a
compilation of Imperial legislation), and the Novels (a supplementary
compilation of further Imperial legislation). By 1235, the learned
Bolognese lawyers had acquired specially privileged status as "doctors
of law"-and had acquired, as well, a rich scholarly tradition and a
prestige that had attracted students from remote parts of the western
continent.2o Bologna had, moreover, become a center of more than
legal scholarship: Students came to study not only law, but also the
"ars dictaminis," the art of crafting formal letters and documents. The
Rhetorica Novissima was the work of Boncompagno da Signa, a lawyer
who was a master ofthe ars dictaminis (as well as an early experimenter
with the revival of ancient styles of historiography21). Boncompagno
took an active interest in rhetoric, and he expounded that subject
before Bolognese audiences throughout the early decades of the thir-
teenth century.
Boncompagno's Rhetorica Novissima is often cited as a model product
ofthirteenth-century "proto-humanism."22 Yet the passage I will present
here, while it is familiar to legal historians, is rarely discussed by
historians of humanism-perhaps because in it Boncompagno offered
his listeners a piece of scatological invective not much in keeping with
the elegance of humanist rhetoric. In this passage, entitled "De origine
juris," Boncompagno improved on the Digest23 by identifying no fewer
than fourteen different types of law, each with its own origin. He began
with divine law, continued through the law of"the Paradise ofDelights;'
customary law, Athenian law, Roman law, canon law, and others.
Finally he arrived at the laws ofthe Goths and the Lombards, barbarians
who had penetrated Italy centuries before his time; and then the laws
of the Italian cities of his own time:
The eleventh [origin of law] was among the Goths, who promulgated
the lex gothiea which is observed today in some places. The twelfth was
in the time of the Emperor Charlemagne and of certain kings who gave
law to the Lombards-Iaw which is now called the Lombarda. But it
shouldn't be called "law:' It should be called "a piece of shit," since it
is filthied with the shit ofthe execrable masses [Non debet did lex, immo
potius fex; quoniam est feee turpium vulgarium sordidata.] It can also
be called, if the nature of the business can reveal itself grammatically,
"whoever law;' since practically every law begins with the phrase
"whoever " [quia fere lex quelibet ineeptionem habet ab hac dietione
Si quis ] The thirteenth was in the laws of the cities; of which one
finds many examples in Italy nowadays on account of the great degree
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of liberty. But these municipal laws and plebiscites are as evanescent as
lunar shadows, since they wax and wane like the moon according to the
will of those who promulgate them.24
Boncompagno's attack on the Lombard ''fex'' (a pun that was an old
favorite at Bologna25) and on city statutes admittedly showed little of
the humanist elegance of Petrarch. Moreover, there is no doubt that
Boncompagno lacked Petrach's horrified sense of utter rupture between
the Roman world and his own. Neverthless Boncompagno's belief that,
"in the time of Charlemagne;' some sordid thing had been done, and
his conviction that law had declined into arbitrariness in his Own time,
are striking: Boncompagno felt that the proper order had been deeply
offended at some point by the invasions of the earlier centuries-
though to be sure he was vague about the precise course events had
taken-and that the legal order had somehow fallen on contemptibly
hard times.
Two decades or so later, another lawyer, Odofredus, had a clearer
sense of the shape of the historical disaster that had befallen the Roman
order.26 Odofredus was one of the leading law-teachers of the mid-
thirteenth century. Like law-teachers throughout the Middle Ages, he
taught with the texts of ancient Roman law before him, reading his
commentaries to his student audience-commentaries that bear the
unmistakable mark of their origin in lectures, often beginning with the
word "Signori," "Gentlemen." The lectures Odofredus gave to his
gentlemen students contain the bulk of our information about the early
history of the revival of Roman law studies in Italy, preserved in cryptic
anecdotes and historical digressions. These anecdotes and digressions
have found little favor with legal historians, who consider Odofredus
given to invention and embellishment.27 Odofredus's tendency to
historical invention does not, however, make him any the less significant
for my purposes here; quite the contrary, it is the rise of historical
inventions like his that I am attempting to trace.
Odofredus, lecturing some hundred and fifty years before Leonardo
Bruni,28 was arguably aware of the Gothic invasions, and associated
them with a flight of the Roman lawyers from Rome to Ravenna.29
But, like Boncompagno (ofwhose attack on Lombard law he approved30),
Odofredus reserved his special venom for the Lombards and their law.
Odofredus arrived at the topic of Lombard law while lecturing his
students'on marriage settlements. When, in his lectures on the Code,
Odofredus reached the law called "dos data"-a law detailing rules of
dowry law which I will describe in full below-he declared that the
law embodied Lombard custom. This led him to a brief polemic, not
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only on Lombard law, but on Bolognese city politics. Lombard law,
he said lacked the form of a lex: "[I]n order that Lombard law should
have no place in this city, we cause the podesta to swear an oath to
maintain 'leges et rationes.' The city statute-book expresses it this way
because Lombard law is neither 'lex' nor 'ratio' but a certain kind of
right [ius] established by the kings for their own benefit. And [these
kings] are called 'longobardi,' that is to say Apulians, because they
came from Germany, first going to Sardinia, then afterward to Apulia:'31
Here a proto-Petrarchan historical sensibility is clearly on view: In
Odofredus's eyes, Lombard law has a historical origin, and a most
definitely un-Roman and disreputable one. Perhaps twenty years after
Boncompagno's Rhetorica Novissima, Odofredus has introduced, into
Bolognese polemic against Lombard law, some form of the idea of
barbarian invasion. Moreover, Odofredus elsewhere shows the same
hostility to the making of municipal statutes as does Boncompagno:
"When the plebeians of this city want to make statutes for themselves,
they have no more called upon men of learning than upon asses, and
accordingly they make statutes that have neither learning nor sense:'32
The sections that follow trace the confluence of urban politics and
barbarian and Roman legal traditions that gave the impulse to these
thirteenth-century ideas of the violent break with the Roman past,
which seem to us now to offer such a striking mix of naivete and great
learning. In the first of the following sections, I will layout the
background of Roman-Lombard legal conflict in northern Italy gen-
erally, emphasizing Odofredus's concern, dowry law. I will then discuss
the experience of Bologna in particular. Finally, I will return to Petrarch
and the Roman law of his time.
III
Why did Odofredus present his denunciation of the Lombard inva-
sions in a commentary on dowry law? The answer will suggest itself
immediately to medieval social historians, who have themselves been
much occupied with dowry in recent years. As social historians have
discovered, dowry law in particular, and marital property law in general,
were violently contested in the thirteenth-century communes. The
structure of thirteenth-century Italian society was such that marital
property law involved both the most urgent economic pressures and
the most delicate moral questions. Economic concerns may have been
uppermost in the minds of lawyers debating marital property: In
thirteenth-century Italy, as in most ancient and medieval societies,
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considerable wealth would generally pass hands at the time of marriage.
There was more, however, to marital property than just money. The
structure of medieval family life, and of medieval gender relations, also
largely depended on the shape of marital property rules. Thus the
whole delicate complex of sexual and moral questions that surround
family organization were implicated in discussions about marital prop-
erty.
And on questions of marital property, Lombard law and Roman law
differed starkly. In both systems, property changed hands at the time
of marriage. The two systems diverged radically, however, over what
property passed, from whom, and to whom. The two systems also
diverged radically on the status of married women, who were in some
respects better off under Roman law, and in others better off under
Lombard law.33
Roman law was not monolithic. The texts ofthe classical law differed
from the texts of late Imperial law. Classical Roman law offered a
relatively simple marital property scheme. In the classical law, property
passed to the newly formed household from the family of the bride,
in the form of a dowry. The bride was not, however, excluded from
further participation in the wealth of her family of birth. A Roman
woman retained the right to return her dowry to her family of origin
upon the death of her father, receiving in exchange a share of her
father's estate.34 Matters grew somewhat more complicated in the law
of the later Empire. A Roman woman still retained her classical right
to trade in her dowry, upon her father's death, in return for her share
of his property. But Roman legislators of the later Empire developed
a more elaborate system of property transfers in an attempt to cope
with the huge variety of customary systems in the sprawling empire.
Late imperial legislators were faced with a populace that largely lived
by brideprice, an institution under which grooms made a payment to
the family of the bride at the time of marriage.35 In order to accom-
modate both Roman dowry and brideprice, late imperial legislators
struck a kind of compromise, requiring not only that the family of the
bride provide a dowry of the Roman type, but also that the family of
the groom provide a kind of partial brideprice known as the donatio
propter nuptias, the "gift on account of marriage."36 By the time the
Lombards descended into late-antique Italy, "gift on account of mar-
riage;' made by the groom to his bride, was expected to equal dowry
exactly, so that the families of both the groom and the bride should
have made the same contribution to the sum of marital property.37
The law of the Lombards differed strikingly from both classical and
late imperial Roman law. In Lombard law, marriage was accompanied
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by a variety of property transfers. Lombard grooms paid two sums:
one to the father of the bride (generally known as mundio or meta, a
payment for the guardianship of the daughter), and one to the bride
herself (known as morgengabe, or "morning-after gift," a payment for
the bride's virginity, made the morning after the wedding night). The
father of the bride also often gave his daughter a sum, known as the
faderfio. Morning-after gift and faderfio together could be quite large,
so that a married woman's property rights under Lombard law exceeded
a married woman's property rights under Roman law. Nevertheless if,
in this respect, Lombard women were better off, in another they were
worse off: Upon marriage, a Lombard woman, unlike her Roman
counterpart, generally lost all property rights in her family of origin.
Under Lombard law, a woman's male relatives could cut her off, at
the time of marriage, by giving her a single property settlement-a
practice I will refer to as "bridal exclusion."38 Like classical Roman
law, Lombard law underwent some changes over the centuries, but
they were not drastic ones. In the eighth century, the strict exclusion
of brides from the wealth of their family of origin was limited legisla-
tively.39 Soon after, an effort was made by the Lombard kings to check
perceived excesses of brideprice: the morning-after gift was limited by
legislation to a quarter ofthe groom's property; in Italy oflater centuries
this quarta (still, of course, a hefty percentage) became the standard
Lombard measure of appropriate morning-after gift.40
Despite such changes, however, Lombard law remained strikingly
different from Roman in the time of Boncompagno and Odofredus.
Moreover, by the time of Boncompagno and Odofredus, Lombard law
had become the subject of learned study, actively cultivated in schools
at the historic Lombard capital of Pavia and elsewhere from at least
the beginning of the eleventh century.41 Lombard marital property law,
including the exclusion of brides from the wealth of their family of
origin, was sanctified, with a few limitations, in the work of the learned
lawyers of Pavia, in an eleventh-century text known as the Lombarda.42
It was this Lombarda to which Boncompagno gave the epithet fex.
In the time of Boncompagno and Odofredus, there were thus two
dramatically different systems of family law at large in Italy, both of
which formed the basis of sophisticated learned bodies of law. The
differences between these two systems were of tremendous financial
weight. They were of tremendous weight, too, for th~ charged mix of
morals and interests that comprise family law. That vehement polemic
should appear in debates about marital property is thus hardly sur-
prising. That learned Roman lawyers should hate, with particular
vehemence, a rival marital property system that pretended to scholarly
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sophistication is also hardly surprising. But the vehemence that one
might ordinarily expect was heightened when debates over marital
property became bound up with constitutional conflict over the right
of the communes to promulgate innovative statutes.
The idea that communes might promulgate innovative statutes was
something radically new in the legal world of the thirteenth century.
Generally speaking, in the early Middle Ages, law was understood as
coming from two sources: custom, on the one hand; and royal (or
imperial) fiat, on the other. There was no room for entities other than
a prince or emperor to issue statutes; and even princes and emperors
tended to offer their legislation as ratification of customary practices.
There is, perhaps, an eleventh-century exception in the inventive and
disruptive reforming pope Gregory VII, who claimed the right to make
"new laws in accordance with the needs of the times."43 The Church,
however, was exceptional.44 The law of the communes45 did not diverge
from the traditional model: Through the twelfth century, communal
statutes were conceived of simply as codifying custom. Thus the formal
concession of power to the communes made by Frederick Barbarossa
at the Peace of Constance in 1183 generally granted them the right to
be governed by their own "mores" and "consuetudines"-their own
practices and customs.46
In the thirteenth century, however, the communes began to claim
the right to do something almost unprecedented in the medieval legal
world: the right to make novel statutes that did not simply purport to
codify custom. Even princes and emperors had not exhibited the
righteous sense exhibited by the thirteenth-century communes, the
sense of representing a new force in the world, needing new laws.
l'erhaps the communes were drawing on the model of Frederick II of
Sicily, himself a startlingly aggressive innovator.47 Whether or not they
borrowed from Frederick, thirteenth-century communal legislators be-
gan to sound very much like him. Thus the statues ofTeramo declared
"all things wither and nothing lasts beneath the sun;' while the
thirteenth-century statute-book of Forli stated quite matter-of-factly
that human nature was continually busy creating new forms which
Roman law could not accommodate, but which it behooved a city to
deal with in its laws. The statutes ofGaeta, for their part, were prefaced
with the bold statement, times change, laws change.48
Such declarations could, of course, be read as nothing more than
platitudes. But in fact they were accompanied by strikingly innovative
statutes-statutes largely concerned with marital property law. Indeed,
it may have been in marital property law that the communes dem-
onstrated most vividly their willingness to innovate. The statutes in
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the new communes typically ratified neither Roman nor Lombard law.
Rather, they borrowed from both traditions in an effort to restrict the
property rights of married women. This tendency showed, first of all,
in violent opposition to the old Germanic institution of the morning-
after gift. Opposition to morning-after gift was so powerful that it
eventually acquired its own name, odium quartae-that is, hatred of
the one-quarter of his wealth a Lombard groom was expected to
disgorge the morning after his wedding night.49 Where the morning-
after gift had been the Lombard norm, the new communes insisted
that the only appropriate property transfer at time of marriage was a
dowry. In their hostility to morning-after gift, the communes were,
clearly enough, anti-Lombard. But in a second tendency, they were
unmistakably Lombardizing. The statutes of the new communes typ-
ically insisted, not only on the abolition of morning-after gift, but also
on complete exclusion of the bride from the wealth of her family of
origin. Statutes throughout northern Italy in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries ordained that daughters be dowered, and thereafter be
cut off from any further inheritance.so
All of this was neither Roman nor Lombard. Rather, communal
legislators had borrowed from each of the two systems the rules most
restrictive of the property rights of married women. In so borrowing
from both systems, the communal legislators had, presumably, a single
goal: to prevent the dissipation offamily wealth by preventing daughters,
to the extent possible, from carrying offshares ofthe common patrimony
to a new household.s1 This was done, apparently, only ov~r the bitter
objections ofItalian women.S2 Nevertheless, done it was, in the northern
communes in general, and in Bologna in particular.
IV
The experience ofBologna, in this great period oflegal transformation,
was much that of the other northern communes. Indeed, in the case
of Bologna, we can see the northern-Italy-wide connections between
marital property conflict and the drive toward innovative statute-making
in particularly dramatic form. For when innovative marital property
legislation was introduced in Bologna, it was introduced in conjunction
with a violent urban uprising.
Bologna was one of many historically Roman-Byzantine towns that
shared the northern plain with the Lombard kingdom in the early
Middle Ages, and that formed communal governments beginning in
the eleventh century. The city was hardly twenty-five miles from the
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point where the old frontier had divided the Lombard regions at the
head of the Po from the Roman-Byzantine sees and provinces at its
mouths, and its law was accordingly mixed in the early generations of
the commune. Lombard law prevailed in the Bolognese contado, the
subject countryside that surrounded the city. Within the city itself,
many citizens lived according to a mix of Lombard and Roman
customs unusual in Italy.53 With both Lombard and Roman traditions
thus present, the great conflict over marital property played itself out
in Bologna throughout the centuries when the city's international
reputation as a center of learning was growing.
As elsewhere, the conflict became bound up with a new willingness
to assert a sovereign communal right to make statutes. Indeed, the
conflict became bound up with a violent reordering of the city statute-
book, as a result of a major uprising in the years 1228-33. In 1228, a
type of urban class-conflict typical throughout northern Italy54 struck
Bologna: there began a revolt of the popo!o, the non-noble population
of Bologna, directed against the last of the old aristocratic governing
bodies, the curia.55 This uprising aimed from the beginning at altering
the Bolognese statute-book, which was the object of the wrath of a
crowd of popo!o that stormed the city palace in 1228.56 With the
successful seizure of power, a number of statutes were made by the
newly dominant "people in arms."57 Among the new statutes was one,
dated 1233, which definitively ratified Lombard bridal exclusion. The
statute showed the new dowry system, strictly limiting women's property
claims, in full force: "We hereby enact as follows: whoever dies
intestate.... if his daughter has married, let her be content with the
dowry she received... ."58 This statute was a model of the new marital
property legislation.59 From 1233 on, Bologna was thus falling into the
control of its popo!o, and was definitively modernizing in its marital
property law-though to be sure, political conflict, and the process of
statute-making, had not come to end. For decades after the uprising,
violent partisan politics, and attempts to re-make the statute-book,
marked Bolognese city life.
It was thus in the midst of a centuries-long communal conflict over
marital property law, culminating in a violent and innovative reshaping
of the communal statutes, that the Bolognese Roman law revival took
shape. To understand the anti-Lombard rhetoric of Boncompagno and
Odofredus, we must recognize that the Roman laywers had, from the
earliest years of the Bolognese revival, attitudes about both Lombard
law and the propriety of the new statute-making at odds with prevailing
sentiment in the communes.
For the Roman lawyers at work in Bologna during the first century
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and a halfofthe Roman law revival should be seen as, in large measure,
an exceptionalist sect, aloof from the desires of their fellow townsmen.
A few ofthe early lawyers may have sympathized with the legal program
of the communes.60 But others, presumably the majority, desired
something rather different: an unimpaired restoration of the Roman
imperial order. Such a desire inevitably made them unsympathetic to
the pretensions of the commune in which they lived. For men who
desired a renovatio imperii, a renewal of the Empire, through the
person of the Holy Roman Emperor,61 found it difficult to tolerate the
notion that any other body of law could coexist with Roman law.62
The anonymous author of the Questiones de juris subtilitatibus, writing
sometime between the first halfofthe twelfth century and the beginning
of the thirteenth, may have spoken for this view when he declared:
"there must be either one law in one Empire, or a multiplicity of laws
in a multiplicity ofkingdoms."63 Favoring a renewal of the one Empire,
an Empire to which clung an air of sanctity and immutability,64 lawyers
could hardly favor any but the most modest ofclaims ofnew communes.
Indeed Imerius, traditionally considered the founder of Roman law
studies in Bologna, was so much opposed to the political pretensions
of the new communes that he denied that even municipal custom
could derogate from Roman law.6s
If imperial restorationism made the Roman lawyers unsympathetic
to the claims of the communes, it also inevitably made them unsym-
pathetic to Lombard law. Conflict over Lombard marital property law
may have left its mark from the very beginnings of the revival of
Roman legal studies in the late eleventh century.66 Through the twelfth
century, the Roman lawyers of Bologna yielded, at least occasionally,
to anti-Lombard impulses.67 Conflict over Roman and Lombard law
on marital contributions was heated from an early stage on,68 and
glossatorial argumentation attained a high level of sophistication.69 To
be sure, the early Bolognese jurists were capable of mounting sober
lawyerly discussions of the differences between Lobmard and Roman
law. Nevertheless, there is evidence of scholarly hostility to Lombard
law in some of the surviving fragments of twelfth-century legal writing.
Thus Bulgarus, one of the second generation of the Bolognese scholary
revival, and a scholar famous for his opposition to Lombard marital
property law,70 reported the existence of anti-Lombard polemic with
which even he could not agree: "There are some who wish to [argue]
that Lombard law is no law at all, because it does not have the form
of a law. I do not agree with them...."71 Another example of scholarly
hostility came from the anonymous author of the Questiones de juris
subtilitatibus, who was clearly denouncing the Lombards when he
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spoke of enemies "who invade our land" and decried the continued
teaching of enemy law despite the fact that the enemy kings themselves
had vanished.72 The jest beloved of Boncompagno, on the Lombard
fex, was also present late in the century.73 Thus anti-Lombard polemic
presaging that of Boncompagno and Odofredus had begun in the twelfth
century, if with uncertain force.
With the upheaval of 1228-33, however, this anti-Lombard polemical
tradition seems to have taken a powerful new turn.
The marks of those violent years are particularly perceptible on
Boncompagno, who left the most detailed record of opinion on mu-
nicipal statute-making that we possess from the thirteenth century. In
1201 he produced The Cedar, a brief handbook on the drafting of
statutes. He included there a famous definition of statute that corre-
sponded to the prevailing twelfth-century view, that statutes embodied
custom and added that cities throughout Italy made statutes74-statutes
which, he noted, took precedence over Roman law.75 Boncompagno's
1201 discussion did not betray any particular hostility to the making
of statutes.
By 1235, however, when he delivered the Rhetorica Novissima,
hostility had arrived. Let me quote again the thirteenth origin of law:
"The thirteenth was in the laws of the cities; of which one finds many
examples in Italy nowadays on account of the great degree of liberty.
But these municipal laws and plebiscites are as evanescent as lunar
shadows, since they wax and wane like the moon according to the will
of those who promulgate them."76 This was, in fact, only one of several
passages he produced on statutes in 1235. His most biting passage
lamented the fact that Roman law prevailed in only a hundredth part
of the lands of the world and added, "shamefully, Roman law fades
with the growth of the statutes of bumpkins ... abashed, it must fall
silent where statute or 'the will ofthe people' speaks."77 Boncompagno's
legal analysis had not changed. But he had come to express it in an
ugly language wholly absent from his work in 1201. The cause of
Boncompagno's changed attitude toward statutes is, we may speculate,
identifiable: 1233-the date of the violent enforcement of Lombard
bridal exclusion through the new means of municipal state-making-
was only two years before the public reading of Boncompagno's
Rhetorica Novissima. The recent uprising, I suggest, accounts for the
hostility to statutes that marks the text of that work.
Two decades later, moreover, the marks of that same uprising of
1228-33 could still be seen in Odofredus's anti-Lombard polemic. That
polemic belonged, clearly enough, to the Bolognese odium quartae.
Odofredus mounted his polemic in the course of his explication of the
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law dos data, a law that embodied the late-antique decree of Justinian
requiring equal contributions from bride (dos) and groom (donatio
propter nuptias). It began: "A dowry once given entitles the giver to a
gift on account of marriage [donatio propter nuptias]."78 Odofredus,
like some other Roman lawyers, interpreted the phrase donatio propter
nuptias as a translation of "morning-after gift";79 he read the law dos
data, accordingly, as sanctioning Lombard practice. When he com-
mented on that law, he was thus addressing himself to a bitter current
social conflict.
It was a bitter conflict in which he was not more than partially
victorious. For while the system ofmorning-after gift had been abolished
in Bologna, it had not been abolished through the direct influence of
Roman lawyers like Odofredus. Rather, the abolition had been the
work of the revolt of 1228-33. Odofredus himself referred to the
consequences of the revolt as he lectured his students. He described
for them the pre-1233 order: "Once upon a time-indeed, not twenty-
five years ago-things were done according to the practice [ofmorning-
after gift]."80 Clearly the date, "not twenty-five years ago;' when
morning-after gift was abolished in Bologna, must fall around 1228-
33. It was the triumph of those revolutionary years which allowed
Odofredus to declare, in his commentary on the law dos data, that
Lombard law had no place in the Bolognese statute-book. It was
because he condemned Lombard marriage practices that he launched
into his anti-Lombard polemic in a commentary on the law dos data.
Let me quote Odofredus's commentary once again: "[I]n this city, we
cause the podesta to swear an oath to maintain 'leges et rationes.' And
this embodied in the city statute-book, as Lombard law is neither'lex'
nor 'ratio.' . . ."81 Reading the passage against its larger background, we
can see that Odofredus, when he spoke of the history of Lombard law,
spoke with the vivid memory of recent and far-reaching constitutional
change in his own city. Direct experience of social change of a very
radical kind, imposed by politics of a very violent kind, underlay
Odofredus's new historical sensibility.82
And the frustration ofpolitical defeat underlay his polemical attitude.
Odofredus could not approve of the Bolognese constitutional change.
Like Boncompagno's, his heart lay with the revival of Roman law in
its pure form as he understood it.83 If the statute-book did not precisely
embody Lombard law, it did not embody Roman law either (the law
on bridal exclusion began "Whoever .. ."!). So it was that Odofredus
complained bitterly that the learned lawyers had not been entrusted
with the drafting of the city laws. For the popolo had made the laws
and continued to make the laws in subsequent decades.84 To quote
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once more his resentful attack on popular statute-making: "When the
plebeians of this city want to make statutes for themselves, they have
no more called upon men of learning than upon asses, and accordingly
they make statutes that have neither rhyme nor reason."ss In sum, we
can see an Odofredus resentful at the work of a commune performed
through innovative statute-making rather than through the operation
of Roman revivalist scholarship.
We can see a similar Boncompagno. To the extent the uprising of
1228-33 belonged to the odium quartae, it cannot have been entirely
unwelcome to a Boncompagno. He, after all, shared Odofredus's distaste
for Lombard morning-after gift, fouled as it was by shit ofthe "execrable
masses." Perhaps, then, we see Boncompagno offering some words of
approval for some of the work of the revolution when he praised-to
be sure, in an ironic spirit-the accomplishments of statute-makers.
He arrived at the subject of statutes in the course ofa model "Invective
against glossators": "It is not more marvelous than marvelous, nay
more miserable than mis~rable, that municipal laws, plebiscites and
the statutes of bumpkins, glow with such felicity and authority that
they can be understood on a simple reading without gloss or commen-
tary ... 1"S6 Most of this was simply irony at the expense of glossators.
Nevertheless, we should also recognize that Boncompagno was appealing
to some real sense, current among his listeners, of the jelicitas atque
auctoritas of at least some statutes. Still, it remains clear that Boncom-
pagno found it difficult to accept statutes beginning "whoever, ..."
ratifying bridal exclusion, and imposed by uprisings of a popolo not
much obedient to the aspirations of Roman lawyers.
Taking all this in sum, we can discern something of the confluence
of intellectual ambitions, social struggles, and political experience that
colored the thinking of purist Roman lawyers in the thirteenth century.
In Odofredus, and possibly also in Boncompagno, we can see the traces
ofwidespread controversy over family wealth, a controversy that stirred
violence and polemical venom throughout communal society. In both
Odofredus and Boncompagno we can read unfulfilled longing for the
ancient order, and hatred for the Lombard law that in part triumphed
in the legal struggles of the day. It was from their hatred of Lombard
law that the idea of the Lombard invasions as a barbarizing calamity
grew in these men. Their historical consiciousness thus began in Roman
revivalist polemic, mounted in an age of polemic.
In all of this, the special significance of their experience of urban
political upheaval deserves emphasis. Earlier lawyers had mounted
polemic against Lombard law without proposing anything quite like
the Petrarchan idea of barbarian invasions. Before Boncompagno and
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Odofredus took the final step into specifically historical polemic,
something intervened: the experience ofpolitical violence and statutory
innovation in Bologna. Both men had, before their eyes, scenes of
violent rupture in the political order of their own city, during the
uprising of 1228-33, and violent rupture that had introduced into the
world an aggressively new form of law. It was in the face of this partly
Lombardizing rupture that they began to speak ofthe Lombard irruption
into Rome. Indeed, it is worth dwelling on the close consonance
between lived experience and form ofhistorical thought in these lawyers.
It was precisely what they experienced in their own commune-violent
rupture, forceable innovation-that was replicated in the incipient
Petarchan sense that characterized their historical polemic: the sense
that history is a thing of sudden caesura, of calamity.87
v
In 1320, some sixty years after Odofredus's lecture on the lex dos
data, the sixteen-year-old Petrarch arrived as a law student at Bologna.
Prevailing methods and beliefs among the Roman lawyers had, in the
meantime, begun to change, and to change quite radically in some
respects. Sometime near the height of Odofredus's activity, the first
century and a half of Bolognese legal learning was fixed by the general
acceptance of the Glossa Ordinaria of Accursius, who died around
1263. With the fixing of the Glossa Ordiniaria, Roman law debate
began to free itself from the strict confines of direct explication of the
texts of the Corpus Juris; over the next generations, what are now
called the "commentators" came to dominate Bolognese Roman law
scholarship, bringing with them a profoundly changed attitude.
It was a changed attitude that can perhaps most conveniently be
described by means of an analogy to art history. The transformation
of Bolognese law was similar both in kind and extent to the larger
transformation of European art that goes by the name "International
Gothic Style." Thirteenth-century lawyers had embraced, as it were, a
proto-Renaissance or "renascence" style: a classical revivalist style
much like the classical revivalist style which culminated in the classi-
cizing art of the Pisani, Giotto, and others. By contrast, after the mid-
fourteenth century, artists (notably in Bologna in particular) began to
abandon the classical revivalist style in favor of the so-called Interna-
tional Gothic Style, which showed little of the old determination to
revive ancient models.88 Where a Giotto had attempted to evoke, in
what he perceived as its purity, the ancient world, artists of the
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International Gothic Style, under growing French influence,89 preferred
to describe, with a graceful, delicately heightened realism, the existing
order of their own world. Something of the same shift, from evocation
to description, took place among the lawyers. By the mid-fourteenth
century, Bolognese lawyers had ceased striving to revive Antiquity. Like
contemporary Bolognese artists, they too began looking to French
models90-models that were not motivated by classicizing purism, but
rather sought to balance and blend the various legal sources at large
in the European fourteenth century. The result was what could well be
called the International Gothic Style in law. Where lawyers of the time
of Odofredus and Boncompagno had attempted simply to explicate
Roman law, in the hope of reinstituting the ancient legal order, their
Bolognese successors began to reorder and rethink Roman law, in the
hope of making it a functioning element in an eclectic modern legal
system-a legal system that would, as it were, offer a graceful descrip-
tion, in the International Gothic mode, of the contemporary world.
Where lawyers of the time of Odofredus and Boncompagno had hoped
to conform the world to Roman law, their successors wished to conform
Roman law to the world.
With this change in attitude, the old hostility toward municipal
statutes began to slip away. The thirteenth century lawyers had been,
as it were, anti-civic humanists, advocates of an imperial tradition
fundamentally hostile to the sovereign authority of communes to make
statutes. To the commentators (whom Kelley would ~all "civil
humanists"91), by contrast, municipal statutes became an established
part of the legal landscape-not a derogation from a proper Roman
order, but simply one of many legitimate aspects of a varied modern
legal world in which practitioners had to function. The change in
attitude toward municipal statutes came, to be sure, slowly. Early in
the fourteenth century, Odofredus's attitude to municipal statute-
making could still be found, elegantly argued in the work of one of
the most prominent early commentators: Petrarch's teacher and the
pioneer of the Dolce stil nuovo in poetry, Cino da Pistoia.92 Cino was
one of the last of the Bolognese lawyers to invoke the old thirteenth-
century arguments in favor of the use of Roman law over statutes, and
he invoked them in the old thirteenth-century context of dowry law.
Cino was generally willing to accept the new communal marital property
order.93 But he denied the legitimacy of statute-making as a way of
instituting the new order. He wrote, "throughout virtually all of Italy
there are customs and statutes which declare that daughters do not
inherit along with brothers, but rather are to be dowered either by
their fathers or by their brothers.... The resolution of this point of
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law depends on whether an inheritance can be abolished by statute.
This matter has been debated in Bologna. The answer is that a statute
cannot have such an effect."94 Cino preferred to see the new ends
achieved through the reinterpretation of Roman law, without the
intrusion of statutes. Thus at least one Roman lawyer embodied both
the thirteenth-century attitude and the skill at vernacular verse that
would characterize Petrarch as well; perhaps some of this attitude was
also present in the surviving verse of Lovato Lovati, the lawyer-poet
of late thirteenth-century Padua whom Petrarch admired.95
After Cino, however, a new generation of practically minded com-
mentators began a revolution: The new acceptance of the sovereign
right of city republics to make statutes spread among the Bolognese
lawyers. By the 1330s, Bartolus (and after him his great student Baldus),
the lawyers who dominated Bolognese scholarship during Petrarch's
adulthood, were on the scene. These were men willing to accept the
integration of municipal statutes into the legal system in a way that
diverged sharply from the approach of Cino.96 Indeed, Baldus endorsed
the old formula that had prefaced the statutes of Forli in the revolu-
tionary thirteenth century: "Human nature;' he observed, "is forever
creating new forms;'97 The force of resentment against non-Roman
law that had driven so much ofthe work ofthe late glossators dissipated
in the newly practical atmospheFe of bartolist Bologna.
I suggest that Petrarch's distaste for lawyers was at least in part
distaste for the new "Gothic Style" of the commentators, the style that
had begun to establish itself during his student years, and that came
to dominate Italian legal life in the latter half of the fourteenth century.
The thirteenth-century revivalists attitude-echoes of which could still
be heard when, in a testy letter, the elderly Petrarch attempted to offer
legal advice on the public pig problem in Padua98-was much more
congenial to Petrarch than what he found in the legal scholarship of
his own day. Let me quote again the passage with which I began:
Petrarch abandoned law, "not because I disliked the power and authority
of Roman law, which are undoubtedly very great, or its saturation with
Roman antiquity, which I love; but because men, in their wickedness,
pervert Roman law when they employ it."99 It was the employment (if
so we should translate usus) of Roman law that bothered Petrarch; and
employment was very much the fourteenth-century concern. Petrarch
was far more at home in a thirteenth-century world ofvisionary Roman
revivalists than in a fourteenth-century world of practically minded
Gothic legal realists. What he rejected was thus, perhaps, not Italian
Roman law as SUCh, but the Italian Roman law of the commentators;
and to that extent, he looked, not forward to the era of Bruni, but
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backward to the era of the thirteenth-century doctors, ~fBoncompagno
and Odofredus, ofthe anti-civic humanism ofthe early Roman lawyers;
to that extent he was as much atavist as innovator. He was still fixed
in the attitude of his teacher Cino-an attitude already faIling into
rapid eclipse during his student years.
Whether Petrarch would have accepted the Roman law of the
thirteenth-century lawyers or not, in those lawyers the beginnings of
the Petrarchan outlook were already to be found, formed at the juncture
ofintellectual ambition, social conflict, and urban violence. The fracture
between the ancient and modern worlds was not a historical reality
noticed by Petrarch; it was historical reality constructed, in the face of
disturbing legal change, by thirteenth-century Roman lawyers who tried
and failed to establish the exclusive use ofRoman law. The "discovery"
of the fall of Rome was, at least in part, the product of the thwarted
hopes of the thirteenth-century advocates of Roman law-Roman law
which thus proved itself, in this as in many other times and places,
the medium of European intellectual engagement with the historical
world par excellence.
NOTES
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a meeting of the American
Roman Law Society. I am grateful to the participants for their comments. I
would also like, in particular, to acknowledge the helpful comments ofRichard
Fraher, Donald R. Kelley, and Laurent Mayali. Responsibility for any errors
is of course my own.
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C.,Sutter, Aus Leben und Schri/ten des Magisters Boncompagno (Freiburg, 1894), 4ff.
22. See esp. T. Tunberg, "What is Boncompagno's 'Newest Rhetoric'?" in Traditio
42 (1986): 299-334, and the literature cited there. Parts of the Rhetorica Novissima are
reproduced in L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in the Middle Ages (New
York, 1971), 41-46. On Boncompagno, see esp. Sutter, Boncompagno; G. Misch,
Geschichte der Autobiographie (Frankfurt a.M., 1962), 3:2:2, 1099-1123.
23. Cf. the "De origine juris" of Pomponius, at D. 1.2.2.
24. Boncompagno da Signa, Rhetorica Novissima (ed. Gaudenzi) in A. Gaudenzi,
ed., Scripta Anecdota Glossatorum (Bologna, 1892),2:253: "Undecima fuit apud Gothos
qui legem gothicam ediderunt, que hodie in quibusdam partibus observatur. Duodecima
fuit tempore imperatoris Karoli et quorundam regum qui Longobardis legem diderunt,
que vocatur hodie Longobarda. Sed non debet dici lex, immo potius fex; quoniam est
fece turpium vulgarium sordidata. Posset etiam dici, si natura facultatis grammatice
pateretur, lex siquata; quia fere lex quelibet inceptionem habet ad hac dictione Si quis.
Tertiadecima fuit in legibus municipalibus; quas hodie Italia specialiter imitatur propter
omnimodam libertatem. Sed iste leges municipales atque plebiscita sicut umbra lunatica
evanescunt, quoniam ad similitudinem lune crescunt iugiter et decrescunt secundum
arbitrium conditorum:' The fourteenth origin, to complete the roll of laws of the era
of decline: "iniuriosi et dampnabilis iuris origo fuit tempore Machometti. .. :' Bon-
compagno was not the last to note that laws in some legal systems tend to begin "si
quis...." For an analysis of "whoever law" as characteristically primitive, see D.
Daube, Forms ofRoman Legislation (Oxford, 1956),2-8.
25. According to Kuttner, the "rude pun" on lex/fex dates back as far as the
Bolognese canonist Huguccio, working at the end of the twelfth century. See S. Kuttner,
"The Revival of Jurisprudence" in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,
ed. R. L. Benson and G. Constable (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 306, citing Huguccio,
Summa 32.4.15. Professor Kelley elegantly translates this inelegant gag as "not writ
but shit:' Kelley, "Clio and the Lawyers;' 37.
26. For the dating, see below, n. 84.
27. See, e.g., among many, E. Spagnesi, Wernerius Bononiensis Judex. La Figura
Storica d'Jrnerio, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria:' Studi XVI
(Florence, 1970), 14.
28. Cf. Bruni, "De bello Italico adversus Gothos gesto libri IV. Prooemium;' in
Leonardo Bruni Aretino, Humanistisch-Philosphische Schri/ten, Quellen zur Geistes-
geschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, vol. 1, H. Baron, ed. (Leipzig, 1928),
148: "Huius autem belli, quod nunc scripturi sumus, nulla apud Latinos notitia
supererat, fama tantummodo quaedam et ea ipsa tenuis admodum et obscura:'
29. Odofredus on Infortiatum, L. 82 ad L. Falc., verb. Tres Partes: "Debetis scire,
studium fuit primo Romae, postea propter bella quae fuerunt in Marchia destructum
est studium, tunc in Italia secundum locum obtinebat Pentapolis quae dicta Ravenna
postea, unde Karolus fixit pedes suos, et ibi est testamentum eius, unde ibi cepit esse
studium, post mortem Karoli, civitas ilIa collapsa est, postmodum fuit translatum
studium ad civitatem istam." Quoted in N. Tamassia, "Odofredo;' repro in Tamassia,
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Scritti di Storia Giuridica (Padua, 1967), 2:384 n. 108. For the identification of the
"bella quae fuerunt in Marchia" with the invasions of Theodoric, see Kantorowicz,
Studies in the Glossators, 196. Scholars are, however, uncertain what "bella in Marchia"
Odofredus may have meant. See G. Cencetti, "Studium fuit Bononie:' in Le Origini
del/'Universita, G. Arnaldi, ed., (Bologna, 1974), 102.
30. For Odofredus's approving citation of Boncompagno's polemic against the
"fetidissimum ius:' see Tatpassia, "Odofredo:' 422 n. 6, citing Odofredus's commentary
on C. 4.46.5.P.76B.
31. Odofredus on C. 5.3.38 (Auth. dos data): "Sed, Signori, hoc erat secundum
consuetudinem longobardorum, unde ut non habeat locum longobardorum ius, in
civitate ista, facimus iurare ita potestatem servare leges et rationes. Et ita continetur
in Statuto huius civitatis cum longobarda non est lex nec ratio, sed est quoddam ius,
quod faciebant Reges per se, et vocantur longobardi, id est apuli, quia primo venerunt
de Germania in Sardiniam et postea in ApuIiam." Quoted in Tamassia, "Odofredo:'
422 n. 7. Tamassia suggests that Odofredus's odd reference to Sardinia may reflect
confusion over the tradition that the Lombards had come from, in the words of Paul
the Deacon, "Scadinavia:' But was such confusion really possible? The text of Paul
was widely known, and any number of accounts of Lombard history recorded the
origin of the Lombards in "Scandza" or "Scatinavia" or "Scadinavia:' See generally
the texts collected in Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Scriptores Rerum Langobar-
dicarum et Italicarum Saec. VI-IX), ed. G. Waitz et aI. (Hannover, 1878). I cannot
discover in any of those texts any likely source for Odofredus's statement. On this
passage cf. also Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 102. I am grateful to Professor Walter Goffart
for his aid with this problem.
32. Odofredus, commentary on D. l.3.1.P.IOA: "Quando plebeii huius civitatis
volunt facere sua statuta, non plus vocarent prudentes quan tot asinos, et ideo ideo
ipsi faciunt talia statuta qui nec habent latinum nec sententiam:' Quoted in Tamassia,
"Odofredo:' 341 n. 1.
33. For the general history in Italy, see M. Bellomo, Ricerche sui Rapporti Patri-
moniali Ira Coniugi, Ius Nostrum 7 (Milan, 1961). For older research, see F. Ercole,
"Vicende Storiche della Dota Romana nella Pratica Medievale dell'ltaIia Superiore"
in Archivio Giuridico 80 (1908): 393-490; ibid., 81 (1908): 34-148; F. Brandileone,
Scritti di Storia del Diritto Italiano (Bologna, 1931). Cf. also Kantorowicz, Studies in
the Glossators, 94ff. and esp. 100-2.
34. This was the so-called right of collatio dotis. For a discussion with further
references, see L. Mayali, Droit savant et coutumes: Eexclusion desfilles dotees, XIIeme-
XVeme siecles, Ius Commune Sonderheft 33 (Frankfurt a.M., 1987), 6ff.
35. For the terms "dowry" and "brideprice:' see D. O. Hughes, "From Brideprice
to Dowry in Mediterranean Europe" in Journal ofFamily History 3 (1978): 262-96.
There is some dispute, however, about the use of these terms. See J. Goody, The
Development ofthe Family and Marriage in Europe (Cambridge, 1983),240-61.
36. For a survey ofpossible sources for donatio propter nuptias (earlier denominated
donatio ante nuptias) especially among customs of the Eastern Empire, see L. Mitteis,
Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den lfstlichen Provinzen des rlfmischen Kaiserreichs
(Leipzig, 1891), 256-312.
37. Bellomo, Rapporti Patrimoniali, 226-27.
38. "De Nuptiis. Si pater filiam suam aut frater sororem legetimam alii ad maritum
dederit, in hoc sibi sit contempta de patris vel matris substantia, quantum ei pater aut
frater in diae traditionis nuptiarum ciederit: et amplius non requirat:' Leges Lango-
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bardorum, ed. F. Blu(h)me, Monumenta Germaniae Historia (LL.) (Hannover, 1868),
4:42.
39. "Si quis Langobardus se vivente filias suas nupto tradiderit, et alias filias in
capillo in casa reliquerit, tunc omnes aequaliter in eius substantia heredis succedant,
tamquam filii masculini?' Leges Langobardorum, ed. Blu(h)me, 108.
40. Cf. D. Herlihy, Medieval Households (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 50. Lombard
marriage law also embodied an absolute subjection of wife to the power of husband
through the mundio (which constituted literally a sale of the wife from her father to
her new husband) which was, in theory, more rigorous in Lombard law than in any
other of the medieval legal systems (Herlihy, Medieval Households, 48). Nevertheless,
in practice, after the very early Middle Ages, mundio survived as a largely symbolic
sale that left women considerable freedom (Hughes, "Brideprice to Dowry;' 268).
Significantly, the faderfio, too, became a substantial gift by the time of the central
Middle Ages, resembling in many ways a supplemental dowry.
41. C. Radding, The Origins of Medieval Jurisprudence (New Haven, 1988), is
unfortunately unreliable in detail. On Lombard legal scholarship, see still the standard
histories of Italian law. See also P. Vaccari, Diritto Longobardo e Letteratura Longo-
bardistica intorno al Diritto Romano, Ius Romanum Medii Aevi 1, 4 b ee (Milan,
1966); and the observations ofE. Cortese, "Legisti, Canonisti e Feudisti: La Formazione
di un Ceto Medievale;' in Universita e Societa nei Secoli XII-XVI (Pistoia, 1982),
230ff.; and Cortese, "Lex, Aequitas, Utrumque Ius nella Prima Civilistica;' in "'Lex
et Iustitia' nell'Utrumque Ius: Radice Antiche e Prospettive Attuali;' Utrumgue Ius 20
(1989): 101 n. 11.
42. See the discussion of Mayali, Droit savant et coutumes, 13.
43. See the famous "dictatus papae" of 1075: "Quod illi soli licet pro temporis
necessitate novas leges condere...." In P. JafIe, ed., Monumenta Gregoriana, Bibliotheca
Rerum Germanicarum 2 (Berlin, 1865), 174.
44. For canonist attitudes, see B. Tierney, Religion, Law and the Growth of
Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (Cambridge, 1982), 14, 37.
45. For the dating of the rise of the communes, establishing themselves at about
the same time as the Gregorian reforms, see J. K. Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval
Italy (London, 1973), 49-60.
46. See the discussion of F. Calasso, Lezioni di Storia del Diritto Italiano. Le Fonti
del diritto (secoli V-XI1 (Milano, 1946),341. Section 10 of the Peace also spoke of the
"leges" of the communes [in Monumenta Germania Historica (Const. et Acta Pub!.)
1:413], but the exact import ofthis term is not clear. See the discussion ofU. Gualazzini,
Considerazioni in Tema di Legislazione Statutaria Medievale, 2d ed. (Milano, 1958),
89 n. 18.
47. For the suggestion that the Liber Augustalis served as an inspiration in the
Northern communes, see A. Wolf, "Die Gesetzgebung der entstehenden Territorialstaa-
ten;' in Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren Europliischen Privatrechtsge-
schichte, ed. H. Coing (Munich, 1973-), 1:573.
48. Teramo: "omnia veterascunt et nichil est sub sole stabile." Forll: "cum humana
natura adeo novas satagat assidue addere formas, cum p1ura sint negotia quam
vocabularia que sub iuris scripti regulis non clauduntur et quae municipali iure decet
ac expedit cohortari." Gaeta: "ut secundum temporum diversitatem, idem ius eademque
iustitia varie disponat:' All quoted in Calasso, Lezioni, 335; see also M. Sbriccoli,
I:Interpretazione dello Statuto: Contributo allo Studio della Funzione dei Giuristi
nell'Eta Comunale (Milano, 1969), 24-25. Professor Mayali has pointed out, in a
personal communication, the similar example of the statutes of St. Gilles (1215), cap.
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xxviii, De jure fisci: "Mundi status, semper variabiIis et incertus, nunquamque stabiIis,
scilicet inter propera et adversa fluctuans, etiam jura regnorum mutat."
49. The odium quartae can be dated to the year 1090 in Milan. See Bellomo,
Rapporti Patrimoniali, 6.
50. For the dating of the statutes, see Ercole, "Vicende Storiche:' part 2, 102-40.
See also Mayali, Droit savant et coutumes, 56. For the general tendency of the statutes
of the new communes to endorse Lombard practices, see the examples in E Schupfer,
Manuale di Storia del Diritto Italiano (CittA di Castello; Rome/Turin/Florence, 1908),
445.
51. See generally the discussion of the literature in Hughes, "Dowry to Brideprice:'
287-91. See also (from a rather different point of view) the careful assessment of
parallel developments in southern France in Mayali, Droit savant et coutumes, 71ff.;
and the discussion of the imperative of "la conservation de la famille agnatique" in
Mayali, "La notion de 'statutum odiosum' dans la doctrine romaniste au Moyen Age:'
in Ius Commune 12 (1984), 68.
52. See the examples in Herlihy, Medieval Households, 99.
53. Ercole, "Vicende Storiche:' part 2, 138-40
54. See the survey in G. Tabacco, The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy:
Structures ofPolitical Rule, trans. R. Brown Jensen (Cambridge, 1989), 224ff., and the
literature cited there.
55. A. Hessel, Geschichte der Stadt Bologna von 1116 his 1280, Historische Studien,
Heft 76 (Berlin, 1910), 334.
56. Ibid., 332.
57. See the editor's introduction to A. Gaudenzi, ed., Statuti delle Societa del Popolo
di Bologna, 2 vols., Fonti per la Storia·d'Italia 3 & 4 (Rome 1889-1896), 1: Societa
delle Armi, VII-VIII. .
58. L. Frati, ed., Statuti di Bologna dall'Anno 1245 all'Anno 1267,3 vols. (Bologna,
1869), 1:414-15 (LA, Rub. 41): "Statuimus quod si quis moriretur intestatus relictis
vel filiabus feminis, si filia nupta fuerit sit illa contenta de dote que fuit data quod ea
in bonis paternis amplius non petat.... et hoc statutum dicimus habere locum voluntate
consciIii ab anno domini M.CC.xXXIII indictione XI:' There may have been earlier
versions of this statute. Nevertheless, the aggressively innovatory dating of the statute
supports the argument offered in the text.
59. For a later version of this provision of Bolognese law as a model for the new
agnatic pattern, see Herlihy, Medieval Households, 200 n. 13.
60. In particular, the tradition represented by Martinus of Gosia and his followers.
See Gualazzini, Considerazioni, 89ff. See also, most recently Mayali, Droit savant et
coutumes, 41. For adept and subtle wrestling ofthe Bolognese lawyers over this question,
see esp. Mayali, "La notion de 'statutum odiosum'''; and Sbriccoli, EInterpretazione
dello Statuto.
61. See esp. the excellent discussions of Calasso, Lezioni, 333ff.; and Gualazzini,
Considerazioni, 94ff.
62. Cf. A. Gouron, "Coutume contre loi chez les premiers glossateurs:' in A. Gouron
and A. Rigaudiere, eds., Renaissance du Pouvoir Legislatifet Genese de l'Etat (Mont-
pellier, 1988), 117: "Les romanistes se virent contraints d'opposeraun systemejuridique
par essence universel, toutes les sources de droit laYque qui ne derivaient pas de
l'imperium romanum. .. :'; M. Bellomo, "I Giuristi, la Giustizia e il Sistema del Diritto
Comune:' in Legge, Giudici, Giuristi. Atti del Convegno Tenuto a Cagliari nei Giorni
18-21 Maggio 1981 (Milano, 1982), 158-59: "[1]1 giurista e e si sente l'interprete terreno
di una dimensione strutturata in modo eterno.... Siamo qui suI versante opposto a
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quello tenuto dai signori cittadini, dalle tante signorie erette a tirannide, ch'e bene
rappresentato da chi teorizza l'arbitrium voluntatis della signoria come base e sostegno
di ogni norma giuridica locale.... [L]a guistizia serve per discriminare Ie norme del
ius commune, piu guiste, da quelle del ius proprium, inguiste e tirraniche... !' For the
peculiar aloofness of the Bolognese doctors from the world of practice, which set them
apart from jurists in other communes, see Cortese, "Scienza di Giudici e Scienza di
Professori." Generally on this topic, see R. Benson, "Political Renovatio: Two Models
from Roman Antiquity;' in Benson and Constable, eds., Renaissance and Renewal,
339-86.
63. [Falsely attributed to Irnerius], G. zanetti, ed., Questiones de Juris Subtilitatibus
(Florence, 1958), 16: "aut unum esse ius, cum unum sit imperium, aut si multa
diversaque iura sunt, multa superesse regna!' Discussed in Gualazzini, Considerazioni,
19.
64. See the discussion of Cortese, "Lex, Aequitas, Utrumque Ius!'
65. See the discussions in Gualazzini, Considerazioni, 28-29; and Cortese, "Legisti,
Canonisti e Feudisti;' 248, and generally 246ff.
66. So argued in J. Whitman, "A Note on the Medieval Division of the Digest,"
forthcoming in Tijdschrijt voor Rechtsgeschiedenis.
67. With, in particular, the exceptions noted above, n. 60.
68. See Kantorowicz, Studies, 94ff. and esp. 99-100; see also ibid., 220ff.
69. See generally Bellomo, Rapporti Patrimoniali. Twelfth-century lawyers worked,
for example, to construct Roman law devices that would somehow preserve some
effective property rights for the spouses of Lombards. Cf. Vaccari, Diritto Longobardo
e Letteratura Longobardistica, 12. See ibid., passim, for numerous examples ofRoman/
Lombard marriage law conflicts. Vaccari presents these examples without attempting
any explanation of the comparative predominance of marriage-law cases.
70. On the famous debate between Bulgarus and Martinus on marital property law,
see Kantorowicz, Studies, 94.
71. Bulgarus on C. 1.14.3: "Quidam sunt, qui ex hac lege inferre volunt, legem
Longobardam non esse legem, quoniam hac forma facta non est: quibus non consen-
tio ..."Published in "Anhang III" to Savigny, Geschichte des Romischen Rechts im
Miltelalter, 2d ed. (Heidelberg, 1850), 4:476. On this topos, see Cortese, "Legisti,
Canonisti e Feudisti;' 215.
72. zanetti, ed., Questiones de Juris Subtilitatibus, 15: "Qui vero nostra loca
invadunt, quamdiu possent ipsi iure gentium depelli, tam diu statuta eorum velud
hostium non discutimus. Set si regno eorum, qualecumque fuerit, extincto ipsi nobiscum
ducendo invicem seu nubendo coalescunt, quotiens sue gentis vel nomen vel statuta
predicant, non videntur aliud facere nisi vulnus antiqui do10ris refricare. Statutorum
enim vis si qua fuit, una cum suis auctoribus iam tunc expiravit. Reco1unt tamen
adhuc quidam huiusmodi suas, ut ipsi dicunt, 'leges!" For a discussion of the dating
of this work, see the editor's introduction to ibid., VIIIff. For an expression of similar
hostility, see the "Exceptiones Petri;' ed. C. G. Mor, in Scritti Giuridici Preirneriani, 2
vols. in 1 (Torino, 1980), 2:178 (Title, "De iusticia et consuetudine)!' For the Bolognese
mix of suspicion and indifference toward Lombard law, see also Cortese, "Scienza di
Giudici e Scienza di Professori;' 119-20; and Cortese, "Legisti, Canonisti e Feudisti;'
214ff. Disdain for the ''lex rusticorum" of Lombard law may have been so powerful
that learned lawyers preferred to remain anonymous when they commented on Lombard
law. See E. Cortese and G. D'Amelio, "Prime Testimonianze Manoscritte dell'Opera
Longobardistica di Carlo di Tocco;' in J Glossatori (Pavia, 1974), 96.
73. At least among the canonists. See Kuttner, "Revival of Jurisprudence;' 306,
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citing Huguccio, Summa 32.4.15. Unfortunately I have not been able to see this
passage. On Huguccio's attitude, see also Gouron, "Coutume contre loi;' 117.
74. Boncompagno, "Cedrus;' III: "statutum est arbitraria mundi norma que a
uulgari hominum consuetudine procedit," and "quelibet civitas in finibus ytalie sua
facit statuta." In L. Rockinger, Briefsteller und Formelbilcher des eilften bis vierzenhten
Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Munich, 1863-64), 1:122.
75. Ibid.: "non obstante aliqua lege que contra statutum dicere videatur." See the
discussion in Gualazzini, Considerazioni, 109.
76. Rhetorica Novissima, 253. Quoted above n. 24.
77. Rhetorica Novissima, 289: "ius civile non debet plurimum commendari, quon-
iam peripsum vel cum ipso non regitur centesima pars orbis terrarum et, quod est
vituperabile, per statuta rusticorum iugiter evanescit et plebiscita popularia sibi auc-
toritatem subripiunt et favorem: quia non sine pudore tacere cogitur ubi plebiscitum
loquitur vel statutum:' The word "vituperabile" is an emendation of Solmi, accepted
by Gualazzini, Considerazioni, 102 n. 4.
78. C. 5.3.20: "Dos data donationem propter nuptias meretur:'
79. See F. Brandileone, "Rapporti patrimoniali fra Coniugi in Italia" in Brandileone,
Scritti di Storia del Diritto Privato Italiano, 1:318-19; G. Haenel, ed., Dissensiones
Dominorum (Leipzig, 1834), sees. 263, 433.
80. Odofredus on C. 5.3.20. p. 264B: "Iste donationes propter nuptias variis modis
nuncupantur, secundum longobardum vocatur murgitatio (Le., morganatio) sed secun-
dum vulgare nostrum vocatur murganale, unde olim, et adhuc non sunt XXV anni,
quicunque contrahebat sponsalia, dicebantur talia verba per iurisperitum: 'Vos, domina,
habetis in pacto donare tantum in dotem?' "Vos, domine vir, promittis ei facere
secundum ius?' In allis 10cis vocatur antifactum, sed in partibus ultramontanis vocatur
dotalium eius... :' Quoted in Tamassia, "Odofredo;' 423 n. 10.
81. Quoted in full, above n. 31. Note that Odofredus, like the anonymous contem-
poraries of Bulgarus, denied that Lombard law had the form of lex.
82. Odofredus left a description of his own involvement in a typical marriage law
case of the time. He represented a bride who had not demanded her morgincap at the
time of her marriage and who attempted to claim it some twenty-five years later.
Tamassia, "Odofredo;' 423nn.
83. Roman law as Odofredus understood did not, of course, exclude a greater
"solicitude" for the feudal order than was shown by most of the Bolognese lawyers.
On Odofredus's attitude, see Cortese, "Scienza di Giudici e Scienza di Professori,"
140-41.
84. Particularly in the 1250s. (Hessel, Geschichte der Stadt Bologna, 337-40). If
1233 is approximately the correct date for the abolition of morgengabe in Bologna,
then Odofredus gave his commentary on the lex "dos data" "not twenty-five years
later"-that is, sometime around the mid-1250s. This dating tallies nicely with internal
evidence ofthe manuscripts ofOdofredus's commentary that place his activity sometime
between 1247 and 1263. Cf. Tamassia, "Odofredo;' 362.
85. Quoted above, n. 32.
86. Rhetorica Novissima, 292: "Non est hoc mirabilius mirabili, immo miserabilius
miserabiIi, quod leges municipales, plebiscita, et statuta rusticorum tanta felicitate
atque auctoritate refulgent, quod secumdum litteram inteIIiguntur sine glosis et solu-
tionibus alienis... :'
87. For a similar emphasis on the culturally disruptive, and accordingly culturally
productive, effects of innovative statute making, see Kantorowicz, "Sovereignty of the
Artist;' 361.
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88. See the famous treatment in E. Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in
Western Art (repr. New York, 1972), e.g., 155-56. For Bologna as a center for the
beginnings of the International Gothic Style-notably in the person of the so-called
"Illustrator;' who worked on legal texts-see L. Castelfranchi Vegas, International
Gothic Art in Italy (Dresden, 1966), 15ff.
89. For French influences on the art offourteenth-century Bologna, see Castelfranchi
Vegas, International Gothic Art in Italy, 15.
90. For the Orleans school of Roman law that influenced fourteenth-century Italian
jurists, see, e.g., Cortese, "Legisti, Canonisti e Feudisti;' 263ff.
91. Kelley, "Jurisconsultus Perfectus;' 89. Kelley adds that the outlook of the
commentators was "largely independent both of the political 'crisis' described by Baron
and of the 'Machiavellian moment' defined by John Pocock." Ibid. That may well be
true. But I hope I have demonstrated that the Roman lawyers showed the marks of
their own period of, so to speak, "Baronian" political crisis, dating to the thirteenth
century.
92. On Cino as a lawyer, see esp. G. Astuti, "Cino da Pistoia e la Giurisprudenza
del suo Tempo;' in Colloquio Cino da Pistoia, Atti dei Convegni Lincei 18 (Rome,
1976), 129-52; G. M. Monti, Cino da Pistoia Giurista (Citta del Castello, 1924).
93. Mayali, Droit savant et coutumes, 61-62.
94. Cino da Pistoia, Lectura super Codice cum Additionibus (Venice, Andreas de
Thoresanis, 1493), 416, commentary on "Sancimus," [C. 5.4.]: "... per totam quasi
Italiam sunt consuetudines et statuta terrarum quibus dicatur quod sorores cum fratribus
non succedunt ipsas tamen dotare patres vel fratres.... Advertatis sicut ego dixi
predicta solu. pendet ex illo articulo utrum per statutum possit auferri legitima qui
iam disputatus fuit bononie et solutus de equitate quod non possit:' For Cino's attitude
as a late, but particularly powerful, statement of the atittude of the earlier Bolognese
lawyers whom I have described above, see Bellomo, "I Giuristi, la Giustizia e il Sistema
del Diritto Comune;' 158-59.
95. Lovato Lovati, the prominent late thirteenth-century Paduan jurist and poet
praised at Petrarch, Rerum Memorandum Libri 2:61 and discussed by Weiss, "Lovato
Lovati;' included the following lines in his verse epistle to Compagnino:
Theotonicus reboet boreali crudus ab arcto,
Transeat [h?]ac siciens apula regna furor,
Excipiat rabiem Karulus metuendus ab austro
Et videant Ligures prelia pulcra ducum,
Marchia Tarvisii nitidis horrescat in armis ...
Reproduced in C. Foligno, "Epistole inedite di Lovato de' Lovati e d'altri a lui;' Studi
Medievali 2 (1906-7): 55. R. Sabbadini, in "Postille alle 'Epistole inedite di Lovato;"
ibid., 260, identified the events described with the descent on Italy of Conradin the
Swabian in 1267-68. Regardless of the contemporary events to which Lovato was
referring, it is worth suggesting that his experience of those events was colored by the
Bolognese traditions of historical description of invasions of Italy embodied in Odo-
fredus's accounts of the Gothic[?] "bella in Marchia;' and the "Apulian"-Lombard
invasions.
96. For the departure of Bartolus and Baldus from the historic hostility of the
Roman lawyers for municipal statutes, see the subtle discussion ofBellomo, "I Giuristi,
la Giustizia e il Sistema del Diritto Comune;' 159-60; also J. Canning, The Political
Thought ofBaldus de Ubaldis (Cambridge, 1987),93-97 and the literature cited there.
For Baldus's view on the specific question ofstatutes on exclusion ofdowered daughters,
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see Mayall, '~La notion de "statuturn odiusurn,' " 66ff. The full range oflearned theory
on statutes is explored, and placed intriguingly in social context in Sbriccoli, I:Inter-
pretazione dello Statuto.
97. Quoted in Kelley, "Clio and the Lawyers;' 35. The statute-book of Forn is
quoted above in n. 48. Professor Kelley also cites a number of similar statements from
pre-fourteenth-century lawyers involving the public law of the Empire. See ibid., esp.
34 (discussing Placentinus and Cino), 40-41 (discussing canonists). I do not know
whether such sentiments were confined, among pre-Bartonist Roman lawyers, to
discussions of public law, nor whether Placentinus in particular may have represented
some dissenting tradition connected with Martinus ofGosia and the canon law tradition.
At any rate, Baldus's embrace of this idea corresponded with Bartolist accommoda-
tionism toward municipal statute-making.
98. For Petrarch on the pigs of Padua, see Letter to Francesco da Carrara (Sen.
XlV, 1) in Epistole, ed. Dotti, 790: "... dixisti statutum populi vetus esse ne id fieret
penamque additam, ut porcos in publico repertos auferre volentibus liceret. Sed an
nescis ut homines sic humana cuncta senscere? Senescunt iam pene romane leges, et
nisi in scolis assidue legerentur, iam procul dubio senuissent: quid statutis municipallbus
eventurum putas?" The suggestion that this passage reflects the thought of Cino on
statutes is made by L. Chiapelli, Vita e Opere Guiridiche di Gino da Pistoia (Pistoia,
1881), 175. The passage is also discussed by N. Tamassia, "Francesco Petrarca e gli
Statuti di Padova;' in Scritti di Storia Giuridica, 2:527-30; and in Sbriccoli, Interpre-
tazione dello Statuto, 25. For the contrast in attitude to that prevalent among advocates
of communal law-making, note the language of the statutes of Temmo, quoted in
Calasso, Lezioni, 335, and discussed above, n. 48.
99. Epistle "To Posterity," in Epistole, ed. Dotti, 878.
